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ARGUMENT
I.

The Only Possible Appeal from the Decision Below is a
URAP Rule 5 Appeal.
In its response brief, Westgate argues that CPG had an appeal

as of right (a URAP Rule 3 appeal) because the trial court's Ruling
and Order resulted in CPG's motion to confirm the Arbitration Award
being denied. Acknowledging that the Order "also vacated the same
arbitration award and directed a rehearing" Westgate asserts that
"those additional mandates in the order do not change the analysis."
Response Brief at 13. Westgate complains that CPG's arguments
ignore "that the district court's order denies confirmation of an award
and focus only upon the fact that the order also vacates the award
and directs a rehearing." Id. at 18. CPG unsurprisingly disagrees
and asserts that the analysis is changed based upon the decision
made by the trial court. It is the vacatur of the award which is the key
to the district court's decision and the basis for this appeal.
The question of whether the district court's Order triggered the
rights of appeal listed in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129 should be
decided by looking at the language of the Order and of the Ruling
upon which the Order is based. The Order is titled as an order on

1

both CPG's combined motion for confirmation, for attorney fees and
for certification under URCP Rule 54(b) and Westgate's motion to
vacate, and reads:
Pursuant to this Court's Ruling dated September 30, 2010,
attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and incorporated herein by
reference, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that:
1. Westgate Resorts, Ltd.'s Motion to Vacate Arbitration Award
is GRANTED;
2. The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Arbitration
Award dated February 2, 2010 issued in the arbitration
proceedings styled: Consumer Protection Group, LLC v.
Westgate Resorts, Ltd., is VACATED, RENDERED NULL
AND VOID and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT; and
3. Consumer Protection Group, LLC's Combined Motion to
Confirm Arbitration Award and for Attorney Fees and
Expenses and for Rule 54(b) Certificate of Judgment as
Final is DENIED.
By its very language the Order makes clear that granting the
Motion to Vacate, and the vacating of the Arbitration Award, were the
principal and primary purposes of the Order.

Having vacated the

award, the trial court had no other option than to deny the now moot
motion to confirm the award. There was no award to confirm after the
award was vacated.

The trial court was extremely clear:

the

Arbitration Award was "VACATED, RENDERED NULL AND VOID
and OF NO FORCE AND EFFECT."

2

(All capitals in the original).

Two of the three sub-points of the Order addressed the vacating of
the Arbitration Award.

The trial court wanted no confusion:

the

Arbitration Award was vacated, and as a result, the other motion was,
obviously, denied, because it was moot.
The Ruling upon which the Order is based, which the trial court
incorporated into the Order by reference, also makes clear that the
trial court granted Westgate's motion to vacate and, as a result, had
to deny CPG's motion to confirm.

Following the recitation of the

parties' several arguments, the pages of the Ruling devoted to the
trial court's analysis and conclusion address only one topic:
Westgate's motion to vacate. See Ruling at 6-8. The only analysis
the trial court engaged in concerns the motion to vacate. At the end
of the analysis discussing the arbitrator's duty to disclose, the trial
court concludes with "Westgate's Motion to vacate Arbitration Award
is granted." Id. at 8. Only after that conclusion does the trial court
even mention CPG's motion, and only to observe that CPG's
Combined Motion "is denied." Id. Having granted Westgate's Motion
to Vacate, the trial court had no need to, and did not, analyze CPG's
Motion, because that motion was moot.

3

The language of the Ruling is clear. The trial court analyzed
and granted the motion to vacate, and the denial of CPG's motions is
a by-product, the result of the trial court's analysis on Westgate's
Motion to Vacate. If Westgate's argument were correct, that this is an
appeal from a denial of the motion to confirm, this Court should be
able to review the trial court's analysis on the motion to confirm. This
Court cannot do that because there is no analysis in the Ruling or the
Order addressing the motion to confirm.

Westgate is wrong in

labeling this an appeal from the denial of the motion to confirm. This
is an appeal from the only issue addressed by the trial court: the
motion to vacate. That is the only issue which this Court can review.
See e.g. Allen v. Prudential Property & Casualty Insurance Co., 839
P.2d 798, 800 (Utah 1992) (applying the presumption that trial court
decisions are correct "has little operative effect when members of this
Court cannot divine the trial court's reasoning because of the cryptic
nature of its ruling").
Because the trial court's ruling and order focused solely on the
motion to vacate and did not discuss the motion to confirm, the
decision below did not trigger Utah Code Ann. §78B-11-129 (1)(c)
which provides that "[a]n appeal may be taken from an order

A

confirming or denying confirmation of an award." Because the trial
court's decision vacating the award included a rehearing, the decision
below also did not trigger Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129 (1)(e) which
limits appeals to one "taken from an order vacating an award without
directing a rehearing." Therefore, no URAP Rule 3 appeal flowed
from the decision of the court below, and a URAP Rule 5 appeal is
the only logical and possible way to present the issue to this Court.
In Powell v. Cannon, this Court explained that there are
exceptions to the final judgment rule, and that those exceptions are
statutory appellate rights, URAP Rule 5 appeal from interlocutory
orders, and certification of an order under URCP Rule 54(b). Powell
v. Cannon, 2008 UT 19, f l 3 ; 179 P.3d 799. There is no URCP Rule
54(b) certification before the Court. As discussed above, none of the
statutory bases contained in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129 were
triggered by the trial court decision. Therefore, only URAP Rule 5
can provide this Court the jurisdiction to decide the important issue
presented on appeal, whether the motion to vacate was properly
granted by the trial court.

5

The Hicks Decision is Inapposite
Westgate's argument for defeating jurisdiction rests in part on
Hicks v. UBS Financial Services, 2010 UT App. 26, fflj 15-17; 226
P.3d 762. In Hicks, the Court of Appeals found it had jurisdiction over
an appeal brought under URAP Rule 3, concluding it was bound by
its prior decision in Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 382 v. UTA,
2004 UT App 310, ffl| 11-13; 99 P.3d 379. Amalgamated had found
jurisdiction to review an order granting a motion to compel arbitration.
The Hicks case is similar to this case only because the Hicks
trial court decision also involved a motion to vacate and a motion to
confirm an arbitration award, with that trial court vacating the award.
The Hicks case, however, is unlike this case because of the posture
of the case at the Court of Appeals; the Hicks appeal was brought
under URAP Rule 3.

Although, in Hicks, the Court of Appeals

discussed issues raised by Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129, it
ultimately decided it was bound to its earlier Amalgamated decision
which had relied on the Utah Constitution's mandate that "there shall
be in all cases an appeal of right from the court of original jurisdiction
to a court with appellate jurisdiction over the cause." Amalgamated
Transit Union, Local 382 v. UTA, 1J8 (quoting Utah Constitution Article
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VIII, §5). The Hicks decision held that the order from that trial court
was as final an order as the order in Amalgamated. Hicks v. UBS
Financial Sen/ices, fl17.
Unlike in Hicks, in this case the Court is not faced with a URAP
Rule 3 appeal from a final order. As this Court has explained, "For an
order or judgment to be final, it must dispose of the case as to all the
parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on
the merits of the case. In other words, it must end the controversy
between the litigants." Powell v. Cannon, ^|13. Here, the subjectmatter of the litigation between the parties goes on, the dispute has
not been finally concluded, and the controversy remains.
When the trial court granted Westgate's motion to arbitrate, the
trial court severed the UPUAA claims from the common law and the
breach of contract claims. Those claims were retained by the trial
court. (R. 4718.) Although the UPUAA claims were arbitrated, the
other claims have not been resolved.

After the arbitration panel

issued its Findings of Facts, Conclusions of Law and Award, the
parties returned to the trial court which had ordered the arbitration.
CPG moved for confirmation of the award, attorney fees and
certification as final under URCP Rule 54(b). (R. 5797.) Westgate

7

opposed CPG's motion and moved to vacate the award. (R. 5909.)
When the trial court granted Westgate's motion to vacate, both
parties and the trial court understood that an arbitration rehearing
was ordered. It is not to be doubted that if this Court were to hold it
lacks jurisdiction to hear this URAP Rule 5 appeal and the arbitration
rehearing is held, the parties will return to the trial court seeking
confirmation or vacatur of the rehearing results. Thus the trial court's
decision vacating the award is not a final order as defined by this
Court. It does not end the controversy between CPG and Westgate.
The Utah Uniform Arbitration Act Did Not Vitiate URAP Rule 5
The decision appealed here combines granting a motion to
vacate with a rehearing and a denial of a motion to confirm. The
Utah Uniform Arbitration Act does not address the appealability of an
order which combines various decisions. Made on its own merits, the
decision to deny confirmation might be appealable under Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-11-129(1 )(c). But the decision to deny confirmation was
not taken on its own merit.

It came about only because of the

decision which the trial court made, to vacate the award. A decision
to vacate an award may, under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129(1 )(e),
grant appellate rights if the award is vacated without a rehearing.

But, as noted by the Court of Appeals, "subsection (e) of section 129
appears to deny us jurisdiction because the district court vacated the
award and directed a rehearing, the opposite of an allowed appeal."
Hicks v. UBS, 1J12. Because, in this case, both parties and the trial
court understood the decision to vacate to include a rehearing, there
is no right of appeal under subsection (e).
Yet, it is precisely the decision to vacate which CPG is seeking
to appeal pursuant to URAP Rule 5. It is the decision to vacate which
is the crux of the issue.

Indeed, the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act

makes this clear in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-123 when it provides
that when a party moves for confirmation of an award, "the court
shall issue a confirming order unless the award is modified or
corrected pursuant to Section 78B-11-121 or 78B-11-125 or is
vacated pursuant to Section 78B-11-124." In other words, the act of
confirming the award is secondary to a modification, a correction or
an order to vacate the award. Although this is common sense, an
award cannot be confirmed if it has been vacated, thus Section 129
becomes confusing when read in light of URAP Rule 5's discretionary
appeals from interlocutory orders.

9

URAP Rule 5 permits appeals from interlocutory orders when
an analysis by this Court of a statute or rule may be determinative of
an issue. In this matter, if the Court decides the first cousin issue by
confirming CPG's position, there will be no need for a rehearing of the
arbitration and the Court will have materially
termination of the litigation.

advanced the

Westgate has argued that the Court

lacks jurisdiction under URAP Rule 5 because only an appeal as of
right is justified by the decision of the trial court and CPG did not
bring a URAP Rule 3 appeal. But a URAP Rule 3 appeal could not
be brought from the order to vacate because that order included a
rehearing, and such an appeal is precluded by Utah Code Ann. §
78B-11-129(e).

Under Westgate's analysis, CPG should have

appealed from the denial of the mooted motion to confirm. But if a
motion is moot, it cannot form the basis for an appeal under URAP
Rule 3. This Court will not address moot claims on appeal. Baker v.
Stevens, 2005 UT 32, H 9; 114 P.3d 580 (citing Black v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 2004 UT 66,1f 29; 100 P.3d 1163).
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129 creates a statutory right of
appeal in certain circumstances, but it does not take away other
bases for appeal such as URAP Rule 5 appeals from interlocutory

m

orders and URCP Rule 54(c) certification.

Any argument which

seeks to limit the applicability of URAP Rule 5 by barring motions to
vacate from being appealed under URAP Rule 5 if the motion to
vacate resulted in a denial of a motion to confirm should be rejected.
This Court should make clear that Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129
does not destroy interlocutory appeals under URAP Rule 5.
The Majority of States Have Correctly Rejected Appeals in this
Situation
Westgate urges this Court to adopt the minority position from
other states by finding an appeal as of right from trial court decisions
combining motions to vacate and motions to confirm. The majority of
courts from other states which have addressed the jurisdictional issue
presented by a trial court decision simultaneously vacating an award
and denying a motion to confirm have correctly concluded that such
orders are not appealable. Courts in California1, Hawaii2, Kentucky3,
Missouri4, Nebraska5, Nevada6, North Carolina7, South Dakota8, and

1

Long Beach Iron Works, Inc. v. Int'l Molders & Allied Workers Union
of North America, 103 Cal. Rptr. 200 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972).
2
Hawaii Org. Police Officers v. County of Kauai, 230 P. 3d 428 (Haw.
Ct. App. 2010).
3
Paul Miller Ford v. Craycraft, 2005 WL 1593418 (Ky. Ct. App. July
8, 2005).
4
Department of Transportation. State Employee Association, 581 A.
2d 813 (Me. 1990).
11

the District of Columbia9 have dismissed appeals for lack of
jurisdiction.

Some of those courts have held that allowing such

orders to be appealed would be contrary to the public policy of
encouraging arbitration by allowing appeals as of right before "a
sufficient degree of finality to the arbitration proceeding." Karcher
Firestopping v. Meadow Valley Contractors, 204 P.3d 1262, 1264
(Nev. 2009).

Others have held that "allowing such orders to be

appealed simply because a portion of the order denies confirmation
of an award renders the 'without directing a rehearing' language of
these states' version of [Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129(1 )(e)]
superfluous." Id.
A minority of courts, Arizona10, Massachusetts11, Tennessee12,
and Texas13, have found jurisdiction to be proper. Even though the

5

Nebraska Department of Health v. Struss, 623 N.W.2d 308 (Neb.
2001).
6
Karcher Firestopping v. Meadow Valley Contractors, 204 P.3d 1262
(Nev. 2009).
7
In re Arbitration, State of N.C. & Davidson & Jones Construction
Co., 323 S.E.2d 466 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
8
Double Diamond Construction v. Farmers Coop. Elevator
Association, 656 N.W.2d 744 (S.D. 2003).
9
Connerton, Ray & Simon v. Simon, 791 A.2d 86 (D.C. 2002).
10
Wages v. Smith Barney 937 P.2d 715 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).
11
Fazio v. Emp'rs' Liability Assur. Corp., 197 N.E.2d 598 (Mass.
1964).
12
Boyle v. Thomas, 1997 WL 710912 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 1997).
19

Utah Court of Appeals did not decide the issue directly, some have
interpreted the Hicks decision as aligning Utah with the minority
position.14
Contrary to Westgate's argument, CPG's position reaffirms the
public policy favoring arbitration by ensuring a degree of finality
before finding a right of appeal as of right, while preserving the
important URAP Rule 5 appeals for interlocutory orders if the trial
court errs in vacating an award. Westgate's argument, that under
CPG's interpretation a prevailing party could be denied appellate
review indefinitely (Response Brief at 23), fail s to recognize that
URAP Rule 5 appeals, the appeal being pursued in this matter, exist
to protect a party from an erroneous trial court decision. It is CPG's
position, not Westgate's, which ensures review that a "court-ordered
'do over' is necessary." Id. It is CPG's position driving this appeal
that the trial court's "do over" order is not necessary in this case, and
that this Court should reverse that lower court order.

Westgate's

argument is aimed at the contrary result, preventing this Court from
reviewing the trial court's "do over" order.

13

East Texas Salt Water Disposal Co. v. Werline, 307 S.W. 3d 267
(Tex. 2010).
14
Id. at 273.

13

Finding that a trial court order (which vacates an arbitration
award thus mandating a denial of a concurrent motion to confirm)
does not create a right of appeal under the Uniform Arbitration Act is
consistent with the statute's dictate that trial courts must first rule on
motions to vacate, correct or modify. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11123. Such an understanding does not cause any conflict within the
Uniform Arbitration Act. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129(1 )(c), which
grants a right of appeal if a trial court denies a motion to confirm,
protects the arbitration process from a trial court refusing to confirm
an award simply because it disagrees with the result of the
arbitration. Unless there is a motion to vacate, to correct or to modify,
a trial court "shall issue a confirming order." See Utah Code Ann. §
78B-11-123.

Subsection (c) of Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-129(1)

provides a right of appeal from an order which fails to follow Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-11-123. But there is no basis for an appeal under
subsection (c) when the trial court grants a motion to vacate an award
because the trial court has acted as authorized in the Act.
This Court should find that there is no appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-11-129(1 )(c) because the trial court vacated the
award pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-123. As a result of the

14

vacatur decision, CPG, the prevailing party in the arbitration, can
have recourse to URAP Rule 5 to seek review of the basis for the
order to vacate.
interest

Such a finding by this Court protects the public

in arbitration,

interprets

the

Uniform

Arbitration

Act

consistently, and protects litigants from errors by trial courts.
II.

Arbitrator Burbidge's First Cousin Relationship with George
Burbidge, an Attorney Not Involved in This Matter, Does Not
Justify Vacating the Award.
Westgate argues that the Court can affirm the trial court's

decision under one of two standards, the neutral arbitrator's failure to
disclose a known, existing and substantial relationship, or any
arbitrator's failure to disclose any fact, including existing or past
relationships with a party, their counsel or representatives, a witness
or another arbitrator, if a reasonable person would consider that fact
likely to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator.
Westgate is wrong on both counts. First, assuming arguendo
that Arbitrator Burbidge, nominated by CPG, was a neutral arbitrator,
the relationship between Arbitrator Burbidge and attorney Burbidge
was not substantial and thus did not need to be disclosed.

It is

undisputed that the law firms of Arbitrator Burbidge and attorney
Burbidge have been adverse to each other in litigation, and that

15

Richard Burbidge and George Burbidge have been adverse to each
other in litigation. It is also uncontroverted that the Burbidges have
no close familial relationship, have no active social relationship, have
no business relationship with each other, have no personal
connection to each other, do not speak with each other with any
regularity, and have no financial relationship of any kind. (R. 59795980; 5982; 6076).
There is no applicable relevant standard in Utah law or
anywhere which defines a first cousin relationship as de jure
substantial. Westgate's attempt to make such an argument relies,
not on the UPUAA or on the American Arbitration Association's Code
of Ethics (the AAA Canons), but on training materials which list
categories of relationships which could lead to vacatur. (Response
Brief at 33-34). Westgate seeks to elevate an entry in a training list to
binding status, something which the authors of the UPUAA and the
AAA Canons did not do.

Tellingly, Westgate cites to no court

decision from any jurisdiction for support of its argument that a first
cousin relationship is per se substantial and disqualifying.
Absent any support for Westgate's position, the trial court's
decision cannot be upheld. For a relationship to be 'substantial' there

1R

ought to be some substance to the relationship. When, as here, the
relationship consists of first cousins with a 19 year age gap, virtually
no personal interaction, no business or financial interaction of any
kind, and less of a social relationship than many unrelated attorneys,
it is not reasonable or rational to classify that relationship as
substantial.

Likewise, it is not reasonable or rational to expect a

neutral arbitrator to even recognize the relationship as one which
must be disclosed.
Second, no reasonable person would consider the relationship
between the Burbidges to be likely to affect the impartiality of the
arbitrator.

The Burbidges' relationship is marked by professional

adversarial activities, and a complete lack of familial, social or
financial association. Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(1) lists the type
of facts which a reasonable person would consider likely to affect the
impartiality of the arbitrator: "(a) a financial or personal interest in the
outcome of the arbitration proceeding; and (b) an existing or past
relationship with any of the parties to the agreement to arbitrate or the
arbitration proceedings, their counsel or representative, a witness, or
another arbitrator." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(1). Although the
list is not all inclusive, it is illustrative of the type of relationships which

17

might trigger the need to disclose. The Burbidge relationship is not
similar to any of these factors.
Westgate's argument that the first cousin relationship is an
existing relationship ignores the reasonable person requirement of
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(1). The Utah Code does not require
that all existing or past relationships must be disclosed, but only that
those relationships must be disclosed if a reasonable person would
consider those relationships to affect the impartiality of the arbitrator.
Westgate does not address what standard is required by the
reasonable person.
Courts which have addressed the reasonable person standard
generally describe it as an objective standard.

For example, the

Fourth Circuit has listed four factors relevant to a determination of
whether a reasonable person would conclude that the impartiality of
the arbitrator could be affected. Those factors are (1) the extent and
character of the personal interest, pecuniary or otherwise, of the
arbitrator in the proceeding; (2) the directness of the relationship
between the arbitrator and the party he or she is alleged to favor; (3)
the connection of that relationship to the arbitration; and (4) the
proximity in time between the relationship and the arbitration

18

proceeding.

Consolidated Coal Co. v. Local 1643, United Mine

Workers of America, 48 F.3d 125 (4th Cir. 1995). Applying these
standards to the Burbidge relationship leads to the conclusion that a
reasonable person would not consider it likely to affect the impartiality
of Arbitrator Burbidge.
Similarly, Judge Posner, in the Seventh Circuit's decision of
Merit Insurance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co., found:

"the test in

this case is not whether the relationship was trivial; it is whether,
having due regard for the different expectations regarding impartiality
that parties bring to arbitration than to litigation, the relationship
between Clifford and Stern was so intimate—personally, socially,
professionally, or financially—as to cast serious doubt on Clifford's
impartiality." Merit Insurance Co. v. Leatherby Insurance Co., 714
F.2d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 1983).
In finding the district court erred in vacating the award, Judge
Posner observed: "[t]o uphold the district court's vacation of the
arbitration award in the absence of actual or probable partiality or
corruption would open a new and, we fear, an interminable chapter in
the efforts of people who have chosen arbitration and been
disappointed in their choice to get the courts—to which they could
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have turned in the first instance for resolution of their disputes—to
undo the results of their preferred method of dispute resolution." Id.
at 682.
The specter of such forum shopping by disappointed parties, as
noted by Judge Posner, is no red herring as Westgate conjectures.
(Response Brief at 27, n.7). See Morelite Construction Corp. v. NY
City District Council Carpenters Benefit Fund, 748 F.2d 79, 85 (2nd
Cir. 1984); and Mahnke v. Superior Court, 180 Cal. App. 4th 565,
579; 103 Cal. Rptr. 3d 197, 206 (2009). This case is also such an
example. Westgate does not deny that it did not pursue the obvious
similarity between the name of Arbitrator Burbidge and attorney
Burbidge until after the decision of award was issued by the
arbitration panel.
That is why it is important for this Court to mandate that there
be some substance to any relationship before a reasonable person
can consider that relationship likely to affect the impartiality of an
arbitrator. In this case, no reasonable person could conclude that the
existing relationship, such as it is, between Arbitrator Burbidge and
attorney George Burbidge, could be likely to affect the impartiality of
the arbitrator.

9n

Moreover, attorney George Burbidge is neither a party to the
arbitration proceeding nor counsel in the arbitration as contemplated
in Utah Code Ann. § 78B-11-113(1). Westgate makes the perplexing
argument that attorney George Burbidge should be treated as a party
because his firm, acting as CPG's counsel, could collect attorney fees
in this matter. (Response Brief at 31). Of course, attorney Burbidge
is not a party to this litigation. The term 'party' has a definite meaning
which does not include the litigant's counsel, much less another
attorney in the law firm representing the litigant. But even the terms
were synonymous, attorney Burbidge and arbitrator Burbidge have no
relationship which a reasonable person could consider likely to affect
the arbitrator's impartiality.15
CONCLUSION
This Court should find that it has jurisdiction to hear this URAP
Rule 5 appeal, and should reverse the vacatur decision of the trial
court.

15

Although not addressed in the Brief of the Appellant, the issue of
attorney Burbidge not being a party is properly addressed here since
it was first raised by Westgate in its Response Brief. See URAP
24(c) (Reply Brief may respond to new matter set forth in the
opposing brief).
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